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In many cases, administratively merged interval data contain only incomplete individual employ-
ment records. As an example, German administrative data do not contain the exact length of
unemployment periods because there are unobserved periods in an individual's employment tra-
jectory. Parameters of interest are not point identi¯ed if the econometric framework accounts for
this incomplete information. For example, Lee and Wilke (2008) suggest bounds for a di®erence-
in-di®erences treatment e®ect on the marginal survival probability in unemployment. They bound
the e®ect of a reform of unemployment compensation in Germany using a lower and an upper
bound of the true unemployment duration. While their approach is restricted to a model with
independent censoring, this paper considers a dependent competing risks model.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: First, we present a bounds framework for a competing
risks model in presence of partially identi¯ed interval data by deriving bounds for the cumulative
incidence curve (CIC, see also Kalb°eisch and Prentice, 1980). As we have access to a large data
set that encompasses 50% of the male working population in Germany, we choose a nonparametric
approach in order to impose only few assumptions that may be violated in the real world. Our
work is relevant as partial identi¯cation of unemployment duration is a common problem in merged
administrative individual data and potentially occurs in most national data sets. The literature
using such data is growing in recent years and governments contract out research based on this data
to analyze policy reforms. Second, we apply this framework to investigate empirically the e®ect of
unemployment compensation on the cumulative incidence of local job ¯nding and inter-regional
migration. Our approach thus allows for analyzing a policy question that is highly debated in
the public, namely the question whether unemployment bene¯ts promote or inhibit migration of
unemployed workers.
The ¯ndings of previous research on the e®ect of unemployment bene¯ts on unemployment
duration generally suggest a disincentive e®ect of unemployment compensation on the transitions
from unemployment to employment (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Card and Levine, 2000; Lalive and
ZweimÄ uller, 2004; van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006). These ¯ndings are in line with the predictions
from search theory that considers unemployment compensation to raise reservation wages (Atkin-
son and Micklewright, 1991). The e®ect of unemployment bene¯ts on migration, however, is less
clear. The negative e®ect of rising reservation wages and smaller geographical search horizons as a
reaction to higher bene¯t levels (Hassler at al., 2005) contrasts a positive resource e®ect as higher
unemployment bene¯ts levels enable individuals to bear migration cost (Tatsiramos, 2008) and to
increase expenditures that enhance the productiveness of job search (Barron and Mellow, 1979;
Tannery, 1983). Most empirical studies, however, seem to suggest a mobility-reducing e®ect of
unemployment bene¯ts on migration (Goss and Paul, 1990, Antolin and Bover, 1997). Consistent
2with these ¯ndings, Arntz (2005) and Arntz and Wilke (2008) obtain some empirical evidence with
data from Germany that unemployed with higher previous earning capacities who are entitled to
receive unemployment bene¯ts (UNB) for an extended period of more than 18 months are much
less likely to leave unemployment via migrating to another region than individuals with a shorter
period of UNB receipt. To some extent, the ¯ndings of these studies may be driven by an un-
observed selection of immobile individuals into unemployment bene¯ts or an extensive receipt of
UNB. In a study with individual ¯xed e®ects that should mitigate such biases, Tatsiramos (2008)
¯nds a positive e®ect of unemployment bene¯ts on migration in Denmark and France, a result
that he assigns to the mobility-enhancing resource e®ect of unemployment bene¯ts. In contrast,
he ¯nds no e®ect of unemployment bene¯ts on migration in the UK or Germany. As a drawback,
however, this study does not take account of competing transitions to local employment in a
duration model context. Our empirical analysis thus reexamines the e®ect of shorter unemploy-
ment bene¯t receipt on possibly dependent transitions to either local or non-local employment
via migration. For this purpose, we exploit a natural experiment that generates some exogenous
variation of entitlement length, namely the reform of unemployment bene¯t entitlements in Ger-
many in 1997. This reform reduced the length of entitlements for certain age groups by up to 10
months. We obtain the following empirical ¯ndings:
² Our results con¯rm that missing interval information in German individual administrative
data at ¯rst precludes any clear result as the bounds tend to be very wide. By introducing
additional assumptions, bounds can be tightened.
² For high-skilled individuals, our results are indicative for the presence of e®ects of the en-
titlement length for unemployment bene¯ts on the duration of unemployment. In contrast,
there is no evidence that labour market outcomes for less skilled unemployed are a®ected by
the entitlement length for unemployment bene¯ts. This is explained by a wage replacement
ratio that, for this group, is invariant to the receipt of unemployment bene¯ts.
² The family or household background is an important determinant for the e®ect of a reduc-
tion in bene¯t entitlements in case of the high skilled: The cumulative incidence for local
job ¯nding increases for married unemployed, while it remains constant for singles. The
cumulative incidence for non-local job ¯nding via migration increases for singles while it is
constant for married unemployed.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section presents the econometric framework.
Section three contains the application and section four concludes.
32 Econometric Model
In this model we study state transition times with k = 0;1;:::;K di®erent competing labor
market states. We let Tlk be a random variable of the latent transition time from an original
state l = 0;1;:::;K to a destination state k = 0;1;:::;K. l denotes the original state and k
denotes the destination state with k 6= l. We denote k = 0 as the state of unemployment whereas
k = 1;:::;K represents states such as employment in the local or a non-local area or being out
of labor force. There are i = 1;:::;n independent identically distributed realizations ¿ilk of Tlk.
For simplicity, we suppress subscript i in the rest of this paper. In case of k = 0, the end date of
the last employment spell is normalized as Tl0 = 0, for l = 1;:::;K.
We are particularly interested in studying unemployment duration, i.e. the transition time T0k
from state l = 0 to state k = 1;:::;K, and its realization ¿0k with k = 1;:::;K. When there is
no ambiguity, we suppress the subscript of the original state 0. The latent transition time is then
T0k = Tk and its realization is ¿0k = ¿k. We assume that ¿lk 6= ¿lm for all l and all k 6= m. X is
a vector of exogenous individual characteristics and Tlk are some unknown functions of X. Tmax
is an exogenous random variable that refers to the maximum observation period and tmax is its
realization. In other words, we have independent right censoring at the end of the observation
period. In what follows, r is the exit state which has the shortest latent transition time among





1 if ¿1 = minkf¿kg;
. . .
K if ¿K = minkf¿kg:
Now assume that labor market state K pools all labor market states that are unobserved in the
data. The model can be easily extended to more than one unobserved labor market state but it is
not interesting to distinguish between di®erent unobservable risks. In the German administrative
data, unobservable labor market states that produce observational gaps are self-employment or
being out of the labor force. Since an observational gap after the end of unemployment com-
pensation transfers may also refer to continued unemployment without receiving unemployment
compensation, it is not clear whether an individual remains unemployed or leaves to one of the
unobserved exit states K after the end of transfer receipt. The data structure thus implies that
the unemployment duration and the transition to one of the other exit states k = 1;:::;K ¡1 can
unambiguously be identi¯ed only if the individual receives unemployment compensation during
the entire time period of unemployment.
Figure 1 illustrates the fully identi¯ed case where the observed transition time refers to the
transition time from state 0 (unemployment) to state k 6= K such that ¿r =mink6=Kf¿kg. Thus,
4the transition time is point-identi¯ed with known exit state r 6= K.





In contrast, if there is an observational gap in the data, the true unemployment duration is not
point identi¯ed. Let us denote the beginning of the ¯rst unobserved period by the random variable
C and its realization by &. In our application, this is usually the end date of an unemployment
compensation claim period. In the German context, unemployment compensation stops because
unemployment bene¯ts have been exhausted and the individual does not pass a means-test for
unemployment assistance. Other reasons are bene¯t sanctions for unemployed who did not comply
with the eligibility criteria. Both cases can be hardly predicted and are typically not random.
Since the earliest exit to K occurs at the beginning of an unobserved time period, it holds that
& · ¿K and thus C and TK are not independent, i.e. C = TK ¡ »(TK) where »(TK) 2 [0;TK]
is some positive random function. Given the data structure in our application, there may also
be observations for which the receipt of unemployment compensation does not immediately start
after the end of an employment period and thus there is an unobserved period starting at Tl0 = 0
so that & = 0. Moreover, & is observed only if & · ¿r. In the case of our identi¯ed spell in Figure
1, we therefore have ¿r =mink6=Kf¿kg < & · ¿K and & is not observed.
Figure 2: A partially identi¯ed unemployment duration for which & is observed and & · sk6=K ·
tmax.
-





Figure 2 illustrates the case where we observe &, i.e. & · ¿r due to an unobserved period after
a period of unemployment compensation transfers. As discussed before, an unobserved period
can also occur directly after an employment period (& = 0). In these cases, ¿r cannot be point
identi¯ed from the data and has to be bounded. For this purpose we denote the ¯rst observed
5transition time after an unobserved period as sk6=K. It is possible to construct worst-case bounds
for ¿r:
1. The upper bound of ¿r can be obtained by assuming that there is no exit to K during
the unobserved period. Instead, unemployment continues until sk6=K and so ¿r is equal to
sk6=K = mink6=Kf¿kg. In other words, by ignoring &, ¿r would be identi¯ed as in Figure 1.
2. The lower bound of ¿r can be obtained by assuming that there is an exit to K during the
unobserved period, i.e. r = K. Then the earliest transition to K can occur at & so that the
lowest value of ¿r is &. In this case, sk6=K equals to ¿K + ¿Kk and can be ignored.
If we observe &, the true value ¿r lies always in the interval [&;sk6=K). We now de¯ne a variable
± to formalize the identi¯cation of ¿r from the data as follows:
± =
(
0 if & is not observed;
1 if & is observed
Events ± = 0;1 are disjoint and can be distinguished in the data. If & is not observed in the data,
we have ± = 0, and ¿r is fully identi¯ed. If we have ± = 1, the unemployment duration is partially
identi¯ed and ¿r is unknown. If we knew that r 6= K, then ¿r would be known. But if r = K, we
only know that ¿K 2 [&;sk6=K). The di±culty in an application is that for ± = 1 we do not know
whether r = K or r 6= K.
In addition to the identi¯cation problem that arises from the uncertainty of ¿r in the case of
± = 1, our competing risk setting also implies another identi¯cation problem which is related to
the general identi¯cation problem of competing risks. If risks are not independent, the marginal
distribution for each competing risk cannot be identi¯ed without additional parametric assump-
tions (Cox, 1962; Tsiatis, 1975). In light of this additional identi¯cation problem, partial e®ects
and changes in the latent distributions can also only be bounded. Non-parametric bounds on
the marginal distribution as have been proposed by Peterson (1976) are typically too wide to
infer some causal interpretation. As an alternative, parametric assumptions can be imposed to
tighten bounds or to achieve full identi¯cation. Under rather restrictive assumptions, Heckman
and Honor¶ e (1989) and Abbring and van den Berg (2003) show identi¯cation of the semiparamet-
ric mixed proportional hazard model. Honor¶ e and Lleras-Muney (2006) impose mild assumptions
to obtain tight bounds for parameters within the accelerated failure time model. Our approach
avoids such parametric assumptions which may not be met in our application and hence leaves
the fundamental identi¯cation problem unresolved. As its main contribution, however, it tackles
the identi¯cation problem that stems from partial identi¯cation of interval data. Moreover, by
using bounds on the cumulative incidence curve, it provides a non-parametric tool which has a
meaningful interpretation also in presence of dependent competing risks.
6The CIC refers to the observed probability of experiencing a transition to a speci¯c state prior
to a certain time in the presence of all competing risks (see for example Moeschberger and Klein,
1995). It therefore does not recover the underlying risk-speci¯c marginal distribution of latent
durations. Instead, it refers to observed transition probabilities. Related literature also refers to
this as the subdistribution (Kalb°eisch and Prentice, 1980). In the following, we derive bounds
on the identi¯cation region of the CIC which re°ect the partial identi¯cation of ¿r only. These
bounds do not resolve the identi¯cation problem of competing risks models. Equivalent bounds
can also be derived for the overall survivor curve while bounds for other functions such as the
cause-speci¯c hazard rate or the cause-speci¯c cumulative hazard rate cannot be derived. In the
following, we restrict our attention to the observable risks k = 1;:::;K ¡ 1.
The CIC for transition to state k at time t can be decomposed into a part that is due to fully
identi¯ed observations (± = 0) and partially identi¯ed observations (± = 1):
Ik(tjx) = P(Tk · t;r = kjx)
= P(Tk · t;r = k;± = 0jx) + P(Tk · t;r = k;± = 1jx)
= P(Tk · t;r = k;± = 0jx)
+P(Tk · t;r = k;r 6= K;± = 1jx) + P(Tk · t;r = k;r = K;± = 1jx)
= P(Tk · t;r = k;± = 0jx) + P(Tk · t;r = k;r 6= K;± = 1jx) (1)
for k = 1;:::;K¡1. The second part of (1) is not identi¯ed since we cannot identify r in presence
of ± = 1. Therefore, as discussed before, the second part of (1) can only be bounded. Similar
to the ideas outlined by Manski (2003), we bound the unknown probability P(Tk · t;r = k;r 6=
K;± = 1jx) by an interval which is identi¯able with the available data structure. To see this, we
rewrite (1) as:
Ik(tjx) = P(Tk · t;r = k;± = 0jx)
+P(Tk · t;r = kjr 6= K;± = 1;x)P(r 6= Kj± = 1;x)P(± = 1jx): (2)
The worst-case lower bound relies on the assumption that unobserved periods correspond for
sure to an unobserved labor market state r = K, i.e. P(r 6= Kj± = 1;x) = 0. In this case, the
second part of (2) is zero. The worst-case lower bound on the identi¯cation region of the CIC of
risk k 6= K is then given by:
I
LB
k (tjx) = P(Tk · t;r = k;± = 0jx): (3)
The worst-case upper bound assumes that there is for sure continued unemployment during an
unobserved period, i.e. P(r 6= Kj± = 1;x) = 1. In this case, ¿r is identi¯ed and P(Tk · t;r =




k (tjx) = P(Tk · t;r = k;± = 0jx)
+P(Tk · t;r = kjr 6= K;± = 1;x)P(± = 1jx) (4)
Note that these worst case bounds assume the conditional probability P(r 6= Kj± = 1;x) to be
either zero or one for all t. It directly follows that ILB
k (tjx) · IUB
k (tjx) for all t.
The bounds given in (3) and (4) can be estimated nonparametrically by using Kaplan-Meier
type estimators, as the censoring time Tmax is independent (see Kalb°eisch and Prentice, 2002).
Let t0 < ::: < tj < ::: < tJ be the discrete times at which ¿k6=K, & and tmax are observed. For the
estimation of the lower bound (3) there are dLB
kj observed exits to risk type k 6= K at time tj; dLB
cj
observed realizations of C at tj; and dLB
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with 1 I(Y ) is the indicator function of the event Y .
In contrast, & can be ignored for the estimation of the upper bound (4). Moreover, in this case
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8Note that that these estimators are consistent as the right censoring is independent. A consistent









b(tujx) with b 2 fLB;UBg (6)
and k 6= K.
In analogy to Lee and Wilke (2008), we use the monotone relations given in (3) and (4) to
bound a di®erence-in-di®erences estimator. Suppose there is a policy intervention in a natural
experiment setting and we have X = (G;P;Y ). There are two groups, the control group (G = g0)
and the treatment group (G = g1), and two time intervals, the pre-reform period (P = pt0) and
the post-reform period (P = pt1). Y is a vector of other observable individual variables such as
gender, age etc. The reform of interest is supposed to have an e®ect on the observed risk-speci¯c
transition distribution of the treatment group in the post-reform years. Under the assumption that
the CIC of treatment and control group would have followed parallel paths without the reform,
the e®ect of the reform can be estimated by a di®erence-in-di®erences estimator (DID) (see also
Abadie, 2005 for a review of nonparametric identi¯cation of DID models) as
¢Ik(tjjy) = [Ik(tjjg1;pt1;y) ¡ Ik(tjjg0;pt1;y)] ¡ [Ik(tjjg1;pt0;y) ¡ Ik(tjjg0;pt0;y)] (7)
for r = 1;:::;K ¡ 1, where Ik(tjjg;p;y) = P(Tk · tj;r = kjG = g;P = p;Y = y). Given that we
can only identify intervals for the risk-speci¯c cumulative incidence curve it is straightforward to
bound ¢Ik (Lee and Wilke, 2008):
lIk(tjjy) =max[¡1;fI
LB
















k (tjjg1;pt0;y) ¡ I
UB
k (tjjg0;pt0;y)g] (9)
for k = 1;:::;K ¡ 1. Note that the lower and upper bound are restricted to be between -1 and
1. This is due to the fact that the maximum variation of probabilities cannot be larger than 1
in absolute values. The reform e®ect is estimated by replacing the upper and lower bounds by
consistent estimators as de¯ned in (6).
From (3)-(4) it can be seen that the width of the bounds of the DID changes in (8)-(9) depends
on P(r 6= Kj± = 1;g;p;y) and P(± = 1jg;p;y). As the worst-case bounds can be wide, there are
several approaches to tighten them. In addition to monotonicity or independence assumptions
as in Lee and Wilke (2008) one could use economic reasoning to tighten the feasible interval for
9P(r 6= Kj± = 1;g;p;y) in (2). With this respect it is important to note that P(r 6= Kj± = 1;g;p;y)
can be modelled as a function of time, while in (3) and (4) it was assumed to be constant. As
an example, P(r 6= Kj± = 1;g;p;y) could be assumed to decrease with an increasing gap after &.
Another approach would be to increase the share of fully identi¯ed unemployment durations by
determining an appropriate sample of unidenti¯ed spells that can be excluded from the estimations
without changing the estimates for the CICs in (3) and (4). Formally, this approach reduces
P(± = 1jg;p;y).
Another possibility is to assume cross restrictions on the DID terms to preclude that some of
them attain their lower and others their upper bound. As an example one can assume that the
conditional probability P(r 6= Kj± = 1;g;p;y) is independent of G and P, i.e. P(r 6= Kj± =
1;g;p;y) = P(r 6= Kj± = 1;y) which only depends on other individual characteristics Y . The
DID changes of the CIC from (7) can then be decomposed as follows:
¢
c
Ik(tjjy) = ¢Ik(tj;± = 0jy) + P(r 6= Kj± = 1;y)¢Ik(tj;± = 1jy) (10)
with the e®ect of the reform on the CIC for di®erent values of ± de¯ned as :
¢Ik(tj;± = 0jy) = Ik(tj;± = 0jg1;pt1;y) ¡ Ik(tj;± = 0jg0;pt1;y)
¡ Ik(tj;± = 0jg1;pt0;y) + Ik(tj;± = 0jg0;pt0;y); and (11)
¢Ik(tj;± = 1jy) = Ik(tj;± = 1jr 6= K;g1;pt1;y) ¡ Ik(tj;± = 1jr 6= K;g0;pt1;y)
¡ Ik(tj;± = 1jr 6= K;g1;pt0;y) + Ik(tj;± = 1jr 6= K;g0;pt0;y): (12)
In order to determine the bounds we have to minimize and maximize (10) by assigning appropriate
P(r 6= Kj± = 1;y) at each tj: If ¢Ik(tj;± = 1jy) > 0, set P(r 6= Kj± = 1;y) = 1 and if
¢Ik(tj;± = 1jy) < 0, set P(r 6= Kj± = 1;y) = 0 to maximise (10). The minimum is attained in
the reversed way. Thus the lower bound of ¢c
Ik(tjjy) is always smaller than the upper bound and
the width of the bound is j¢Ik(tj;± = 1jy)j which is tighter than the worst-case bound. Moreover,
P(r 6= Kj± = 1;y) is now a function of tj. Under the additional assumption, (11) and (12) are
thus obtained by bounding the DID changes instead of bounding the CIC as in the case of the
worst-case bounds in (8) and (9). A common di±culty of all approaches to tighten the bounds is
to verify their validity in an application.
3 Empirical Application
We apply the above framework to bound the e®ect of reducing the maximum duration of receiv-
ing unemployment bene¯ts on the observed transitions from unemployment to local and non-local
10employment via migration. We begin this section with a brief description of the German unem-
ployment compensation system and discuss the 1997 reform of unemployment bene¯t entitlements.
This discussion is based on the Employment Promotion Act (ArbeitsfÄ orderungsgesetz), the Social
Welfare Act III (Sozialgesetzbuch III) and several secondary sources such as Pla¼mann (2002),
Oschmiansky et al. (2001) and Wol® (2003). We then introduce the data and discuss the selection
of treatment and control group before we present our ¯ndings.
Basic features of the unemployment compensation system. During the study period,
the system of unemployment compensation in Germany consisted of two main components: un-
employment bene¯ts (UNB) and unemployment assistance (UNA). As an insurance bene¯t, UNB
is limited in time depending on the length of socially insured employment during a period of seven
years before the bene¯t claim. Moreover, the length of bene¯t entitlements positively depends
on age with a maximum UNB receipt of 12 months for younger age groups and up to 32 months
for older age groups in the years prior to the 1997 reform. After exhausting UNB, unemployed
individuals receive the tax-funded unemployment assistance if they pass a means-test. Both UNB
and UNA correspond to a percentage of former wage income. UNB replaces 63% (68%) of for-
mer wage income and UNA still reaches income replacement rates of 53% (57%) for individuals
without (with) dependent children. For individuals with low pre-unemployment wages, income
replacement rates irrespective of the type of unemployment compensation may even be close to
100% because of receiving complementary social bene¯ts. This is the case if the unemployment
compensation as a percentage of former wage income does not su±ce to ensure the legally de¯ned
minimum standard of living.
Due to this design, the e®ect of shortening the length of entitlements to unemployment bene¯ts
is not homogeneous. In particular, recipients of complementary social bene¯ts are not a®ected by
a change in the length of UNB receipt. By contrast, unemployed individuals without additional
social bene¯ts but with eligibility for the means-tested UNA loose around 10% of their former
wage income when switching from UNB to UNA. For this group, a shortening of UNB is likely to
have a small e®ect only. Individuals who do not pass the means test for receiving UNA due to
having other income sources or private savings even loose all unemployment compensation after
exhausting UNB. The threat of entitlement loss should thus be strongest for this latter group of
unemployed.
1997 Reform. In April 1997, a reform of the Employment Promotion Act came into force to
shorten entitlements to UNB for some of the older age groups. In Germany, the potential UNB
duration (PUNBD), i.e. the maximum duration of UNB receipt an individual is entitled to at
the beginning of the unemployment period, positively depends on the period of socially insured
11employment within the seven years prior to the bene¯t claim. This so called extended claim period
is restricted by previous bene¯t claims and thus may be shorter than seven years. In addition,
the PUNBD positively depends on age. During the 1980s, the PUNBD had successively been
expanded for older age groups. Thus, before the reform in 1997, entitlements to UNB lasted up
to 32 months for individuals above the age of 42, while the PUNBD for individuals below this age
range was only 12 months. A detailed description of these earlier reforms can be found in Hunt
(1995). One well-documented result of these earlier reforms that demonstrates the disincentive
e®ect of this system was the rapid increase of early retirees whose extremely long UNB receipt
allowed for bridging the gap between employment and retirement age (Fitzenberger and Wilke,
2004).
In 1997, the PUNBD was reduced for some of the older age groups by lowering the age limits for
certain maximum entitlement length (see Table 1). As a consequence, the PUNBD for individuals
between 42 and 43 years of age was cut from 18 month before 1997 to 12 month after the 1997
reform. For individuals aged 44, UNB was even cut from a maximum receipt of 22 to a maximum
receipt of 12 months. Individuals aged below 42 years were una®ected by the reform as they always
received a maximum of 12 month of UNB. The 1997 reform thus provides a natural experiment
with a credible source of variation in PUNBD that can be used to identify its causal e®ect. As a
drawback, however, the implementation of the reform was partially cushioned. Until March 1999,
new bene¯t claimants were treated according to the pre-reform regulations if there was a work
history of more than one year during the three years prior to the bene¯t claim. Thus, the new
regulations applied to all new bene¯t claims after March 1999 only. In addition, the introduction
of stricter sanction rules for non-compliance with eligibility requirements may have accelerated
transitions from unemployment to employment for all age groups after 1997 (Boone et al., 2002,
2004).
12Table 1: Potential unemployment bene¯t duration (PUNBD) for
UNB claimants up to age 47 by work history and age, IAB-R01
Soc. insured employment PUNBD (in month)
during claim period until 03/97 since 04/97
12 month 6 6
16 month 8 8
20 month 10 10
24 month 12 12
28 month 14 (age ¸42) 14 (age ¸45)
32 month 16 (age ¸42) 16 (age ¸45)
36 month 18 (age ¸42) 18 (age ¸45)
40 month 20 (age ¸44) 20 (age ¸47)
44 month 22 (age ¸44) 22 (age ¸47)
Source: Pla¼mann (2002)
Two German studies already looked at the e®ect of the 1997 reform on transitions from un-
employment to employment. Based on the German socio-economic panel (GSOEP), Wol® (2003)
only ¯nds very weak positive e®ects of shortening the PUNBD on the transitions to employment
in eastern Germany. This ¯nding may re°ect the limited sample size of the GSOEP data as the
study includes only a limited number of spells that were actually a®ected by the reform. Based
on much more extensive administrative data, MÄ uller et al. (2007) ¯nd strong evidence that the
1997 reform reduced the in°ow into unemployment and the duration of unemployment among
individuals above age 52. They reason that a shortening of the maximum UNB receipt mainly
lowers the attractiveness of early retirement through the unemployment compensation system.
In the subsequent analysis, we use an administrative data set that is similar to the one used
by MÄ uller et al. (2007), but with an even larger 50% sample of the male working population. The
data set thus allows for distinguishing between exits to local versus exits to non-local employment
after migration. We can thus answer the question how job seekers changed their behavior in
response to the reform by analyzing the e®ect of the PUNBD on transitions to local and non-local
employment. We restrict the analysis to prime age individuals for whom early retirement should
not be an issue.
Data. We use a sample drawn from the Employee and Bene¯t Recipient History (V6.0) of the
Institute of Employment Research (IAB). This administrative data set contains information of
employment periods that are subject to social insurance payments concerning spells of employ-
ment and spells for which the individual received unemployment compensation from the Federal
13Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fÄ ur Arbeit) such as unemployment bene¯ts (UNB), unem-
ployment assistance (UNA) and maintenance payments during training measures (MP). Our anal-
ysis is based on a 50% sample of the male working population. The data was prepared by the IAB
to have the same structure as the IAB employment subsample 1975-2001 - regional ¯le which is a
2% sample and available as a scienti¯c use ¯le (Hamann et al., 2004). As the access to the 50%
sample is restricted, we did all the preliminary work with the 2% sample and switched to the 50%
sample for the ¯nal and main estimations only.
The data consists of administrative records which are provided as spells on a daily basis.
However, individual employment histories are only partly identi¯ed as there may be gaps in an
individual's record. These gaps correspond to either a period of unemployment without receiv-
ing unemployment compensation or to other unobserved labor market states such as being self-
employed, a civil servant or being out of labor force. This is why the true unemployment duration
is often not observed (see also Lee and Wilke, 2008). An unemployment period is identi¯ed only
if there is a permanent receipt of unemployment compensation between two employment spells.
In this case, an unemployment spell belongs to the case ± = 0. In the application, this requires
an individual to receive unemployment compensation within one month after the end of an em-
ployment period. Moreover, intermediate gaps in the receipt of unemployment compensation or
the gap between the end of transfer receipt and employment do not exceed one month. However,
gaps in the record will often be longer and the true unemployment period is not identi¯ed. In
this case, an observation belongs to the case ± = 1 and we observe & which is the beginning of an
unobserved period.
As discussed in the previous section, we can derive an upper bound and a lower bound de¯nition
for the unemployment spell in the case of ± = 1. The lower bound de¯nition LB assumes that an
exit to an unknown labor market state occurs at the beginning of the unobserved period, i.e. at
&. In contrast, the upper bound de¯nition UB assumes that no such exit occurs in an unobserved
period and thus interprets any intermediate unobserved period as a continued unemployment spell.
It thus equates a period of non-employment with a period of unemployment. Note that in case of
a fully identi¯ed unemployment spell (± = 0), both the upper bound and lower bound de¯nition of
unemployment yield the same spell length. Moreover, exits to an unobserved labour market state
only occur in case of the lower bound de¯nition of unemployment. In the data, right-censoring
occurs at the end of the observation period, i.e. on 12/31/2005.
For all unemployed with a transition to employment, the IAB data allows for comparing the
location of the old and the new workplace on the level of the 440 German counties. In the
following analysis, we assume a job movement to involve a residential relocation if the distance
between the county capitals of the old and the new workplace exceeds 100 km. Labor market
14regions that comprise daily commuting ranges typically do not exceed 75 km in Germany. Most
job movements with a distance of 100 km between the old and new workplace region should thus
necessitate residential mobility. For each spell of unemployment, the analysis thus distinguishes
between exits to a local job, exits to a non-local job after migration and exits to other unknown
destination states.
For our analysis, we use in°ow samples for a pre- and a post-reform era. Due to the imple-
mentation of stricter sanction rules in 1994, extending the pre-reform era beyond 1995, might mix
di®erent reforms. We therefore consider an unemployment spell starting between 1995 and 1996
as a pre-reform spell. The post-reform era is predetermined by the fact that the implementation
of new UB regulations did not start before 1999. The post-reform in°ow sample thus consists of
all unemployment spells starting in 1999 or 2000. Moreover, in order to keep the sample relatively
homogeneous in terms of labor force attachment, we restrict our sample to men who have previ-
ously been full-time employed. In addition, we restrict the analysis to individuals born in western
Germany because the working history for individuals from eastern Germany is not known before
1991 which aggravates the computation of entitlement lengths to unemployment bene¯ts.
As discussed before, the reform e®ect is expected to be weaker for recipients of complementary
social bene¯ts. Unfortunately, the IAB data does not include enough information on the house-
hold context to actually identify recipients of complementary social bene¯ts. In our analysis, we
therefore use a lower educational degree as a proxy for lower earning capacities that increases
the probability of receiving social bene¯ts in addition to unemployment compensation. Indeed,
we obtain similar result pattern when we repeat the empirical analysis for di®erent wage levels
similar to Lee and Wilke (2008). In order to take account of heterogeneous treatment e®ects, we
therefore distinguish between high-skilled individuals who either have a tertiary education or are
master craftsmen and less-skilled individuals. High-skilled individuals who are less likely to receive
complementary social bene¯ts are expected to react stronger to the shortening of the maximum
receipt of unemployment bene¯ts.
Reform e®ects are also likely to di®er depending on the household context. In particular, being
married and having dependent children have typically been found to raise migration costs (see
Ghatak et al., 1996). For these households, a shortening of PUNBD is thus less likely to provoke
a higher level of migration than for single households. Distinguishing between di®erent household
contexts may thus be an additional important distinction in order to identify heterogeneous reform
e®ects. Since the data does not include information on dependent children, but only on the marital
status, the following analysis distinguishes between four groups: high- or less skilled singles and
high- or less-skilled married individuals. High-skilled individuals are expected to react stronger
to the cut in PUNBD. In addition, married individuals are less likely to respond to the reform by
15higher migration rates than their single counterparts.
Choosing the treatment and control group. Due to the reform in 1997, eligibility to an
extended UNB duration of more than 12 month was cut for individuals aged 42-44 years, while
the PUNBD of individuals below this age was una®ected by the reform. Thus individuals aged
36-41 years serve as the group to control for changing labor market conditions when comparing
transitions to local and non-local employment before and after the reform. However, since only
individuals with long UNB entitlements are a®ected by the reform, the exact choice of treatment
and control group has to be conditioned not only on age, but also on the entitlement length at
the beginning of the unemployment period. This is because choosing the treatment and control
group based on their actual UNB entitlements results in a non-comparability of individuals in the
control and treatment group with regard to their working history because the criterium to reach
maximum entitlements is less strict for the younger cohort (see Table 1).
In order to ensure that treatment and control group are comparable with regard to their work-
ing history, a suitable selection rule should thus be the same for both groups. For this purpose,
we compute counterfactual UNB entitlements, i.e. hypothetical UNB entitlements in the absence
of the 1997 reform had the individual been aged 42-44 at the time of bene¯t claim (see Appendix
A for details). As can be seen in Table 2, the resulting counterfactual UNB entitlements are
quite comparable for both age groups. For the subsequent analysis, we choose all unemployment
spells that begin with a receipt of unemployment bene¯ts and whose counterfactual UNB duration
exceeds 12 month. This selection rule ensures the comparability between the treatment and the
control group and the existence of some minimum treatment for the treatment group. For char-
acteristics that are observable in the IAB data, Appendix B con¯rms that treatment and control
group are mostly quite comparable. Small but notable di®erences can be found in the share of
married individuals and the educational degree. Since these are important characteristics for the
expected strength and type of reaction to the reform, however, we separately estimate reform ef-
fects for high- and less-skilled singles and married individuals anyway. Our DiD approach assumes
that both treatment and control group experience similar changes in labor market conditions in
the post- compared with the pre-reform period. We cannot test this assumption, but as the av-
erage age between the two groups di®ers by ¯ve years only, we believe that the extend of non
parallel changes is small.
16Table 2: Estimated counterfactual UNB entitlement length for unemployment
spells in the pre- and post-reform era by age groupa, IAB data
Age 36-41 Age 42-44
UNB duration # spells % # spells %
· 2 months 24,469 7.7 10,131 8.2
3-4 months 18,340 5.7 7,289 5.9
5-6 months 19,133 6.0 7,706 6.2
7-8 months 19,659 6.2 7,783 6.3
9-10 months 20,556 6.4 8,079 6.5
11-12 months 18,354 5.8 6,969 5.6
13-14 months 18,748 5.9 7,091 5.7
15-16 months 18,824 5.9 6,920 5.6
17-18 months 161,045 50.4 61,592 49.9
Total 319,128 100.0 123,560 100.0
a Includes all previously full-time employed men born in West Germany whose unemployment spell starts
with the receipt of unemployment bene¯ts.
For the resulting control group and the post-reform treatment group, Table 3 shows that the
estimated actual entitlement length that is subject to the 1997 reform and the true age of the
individual is up to 12 months only. Note that for some individuals who do not ful¯ll the criterium
for the maximum entitlement length, but still pass the selection criterium, the true UNB duration
may be lower than 12 months. In the pre-reform era, the treatment group is entitled to 18.5
month of UNB receipt on average, while in the post-reform era this average UNB duration falls
to 11.8 month. This latter UNB receipt corresponds to the UNB duration for the control group
in the pre- and post-reform era. The average treatment thus is a reduction of UNB entitlements
of 6.7 month with the treatment ranging from a reduction of one to a reduction of ten month for
individuals aged 44 with maximum UNB entitlements.
17Table 3: Estimated actual UNB entitlement length for unemployment spells
with counterfactual UNB of >12 months in the pre- and post-reform era by
treatment and control group, IAB data
Control group Treatment group
UNB duration pre-1997 post-1997 pre-1997 post-1997
6-8 months 2.2% 1.6% 0.00% 1.6%
9-11 months 7.2% 5.6% 0.00% 5.3%
12 months 90.6% 92.8% 0.00% 93.1%
13-14 months 0.0% 0.0% 6.9% 0.0%
15-16 months 0.0% 0.0% 7.5% 0.0%
17-18 months 0.0% 0.0% 58.6% 0.0%
19-20 months 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0%
21-22 months 0.0% 0.0% 23.3% 0.0%
Average months 11.8 11.8 18.5 11.8
Total spells 104,069 94,309 39,434 36,104
Table 4 shows exit types and median unemployment duration for both the upper and lower
bound de¯nition of unemployment. Exits to unknown destination states only occur in case of
the lower bound de¯nition. Moreover, note that in the lower bound de¯nition, around 40% of
all unemployment spells exit to an unknown labor market state. In other words, 40% of the
observations are only partially identi¯ed and belong to the case ± = 1. According to the lower
bound de¯nition, around 50% (10%) of all unemployment spells exit to a local (non-local) job.
According to the upper bound de¯nition that rules out any exits to an unknown state, around
70% (15%) of all unemployment spells end in a local (non-local) job, while the rest is right-
censored. Moreover, the degree of right-censoring is more pronounced in the post-reform year.
Both unemployment de¯nitions point towards a somewhat higher probability of ¯nding non-local
employment via migration in the post-reform years.
Note also that median unemployment durations are shorter for all groups in the post-reform
years. As has been discussed previously, this may re°ect a combination of better labor market
conditions compared to the pre-reform years as well as the stricter sanction rules that applied to
both the control and the treatment group. Moreover, the descriptive statistics for both unemploy-
ment de¯nitions suggest that the treatment group has a somewhat longer unemployment duration
and that the gap between treatment and control group becomes somewhat smaller for the upper
bound de¯nition of unemployment only. There is thus no clear descriptive evidence from Table 4 in
favor of a reform e®ect. However, this may be due to the fact that the treatment e®ect is unlikely
18to be homogeneous. Appendix B thus additionally displays the median unemployment durations
for the four sub-samples of less- and high-skilled single and married men and suggests that the
positive gap in the median unemployment duration between the treatment and control group in
the pre-reform year becomes much smaller in the post reform years for high-skilled singles, while
only small reductions can be found for married men. The following analysis thus distinguishes
between these four groups of unemployed.
Table 4: Descriptive summary of full sample, IAB data
Control group Treatment group
pre-1997 post-1997 pre-1997 post-1997
LB spells
median duration (days) 185 152 205 172
exit to local job 50.1% 50.8% 48.1% 49.4%
exit to non-local job 8.7% 10.4% 8.9% 10.2%
exit to other destination 41.2% 38.8% 43.0% 40.4%
right-censored 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
total exits 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
UB spells
median duration (days) 258 204 307 232
exit to local job 75.2% 71.1% 72.5% 69.6%
exit to non-local job 14.1% 15.2% 14.2% 14.7%
exit to other destination 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
right-censored 10.7% 13.7% 13.3% 15.7%
total exits 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total spells 104,069 94,309 39,434 36,104
Bounds Analysis We estimate bounds for the e®ect of the reform on the cumulative inci-
dence of non-local and local re-employment for di®erent skill groups by applying formulas (8)-(9).
Moreover, we also add the asymptotically valid 90% joint con¯dence intervals for upper and lower
bounds, which are computed following the bootstrap procedure of Horowitz and Manski (2000),
also applied in an earlier version of Lee and Wilke (2008). The bootstrap repetitions are 500.
Figure 3 shows that when applying the extreme bounds the partial identi¯cation problem of our
interval data precludes any clear result pattern as none of the bounds cross the zero line during
the treatment period.
19As another interesting observation, we ¯nd that the resulting bounds do not coincide with the
point estimates for the lower and upper bound of the latent variable. As shown in Appendix C,
point estimates for the di®erent de¯nitions of the unemployment duration data do not span the
full width of our estimated bounds. This suggests that a sensitivity analysis based on di®erent
transition time de¯nitions alone may be misleading. Moreover, note that we generally observe a
smooth variation of the bounds with the duration of unemployment. This does not suggest any
remarkable jumps in the hazard rate or survivor function at the begin of the treatment. Our
results therefore support the theoretical results of non-stationary job-search (van den Berg, 1990).
Approaches to tighten the bounds As indicated in the theoretical part there are several
approaches to tighten the bounds. In a ¯rst attempt, we assume monotonicity and independence
as done by Lee and Wilke (2008). Bounds become tighter but in many cases they are still wide.
Moreover, by using the 2% sample we found some indication that the independence assumption
may not be valid as bounds cross for some short intervals in few cases. Another natural attempt
to tighten the bounds is to restrict the interval for P(r 6= Kj± = 1). One could for example assume
a shorter interval such as [0:1;0:9]. Alternatively, one could also assume that P(r 6= Kj± = 1)
decreases with the distance between & and sk6=K, i.e. the length of the unobserved period. In other
words, if the unobserved period is short, it is less likely that someone transits to an unobserved
labor market state such as self-employment. As an example, one could assume that P(r 6= Kj± =
1) is an exponential density. We have estimated the bounds under several such scenarios using
the 2% sample of the IAB data. Resulting bounds are tighter and suggest that the change in the
CICs is positive for the high-skilled group. Results are, however, not presented as it is di±cult
to justify these assumptions. These approaches may, however, be justi¯able in other applications.
As an example, a tightening of bounds could be achieved by estimating P(r 6= Kj± = 1) with
additional information from survey data.
Additional assumptions concerning P(r 6= Kj± = 1) are thus able to tighten the bounds but
appear arbitrary in the context of our application. Since the share of partly identi¯ed spells
(± = 1) in our sample is about 40%, another approach is to reduce it. As an attempt, we exclude
observations that do not start with the receipt of unemployment compensation within one month
after the end of employment, i.e. we exclude spells with ± = 1 and & = 0. This is done because
these spells are least informative in the sense that the interval [&;sk6=K] is often large. The resulting
bounds are again tighter and suggest some weak increase in the CICs for the high skilled while
there are no apparent changes for the less skilled. As discussed above, this approach is only valid
if the exclusion of spells is a random sample in the sense that the sample composition does not
change and the shape of the conditional CICs in (3) and (4) does not change. As the latter
20condition is not well supported by the 2% data, we decided not to proceed in this way. Although
these attempts seem unappropriate for our application, we decided to mention them as they may
be more suitable for other research.
Our ¯nal attempt to tighten the bounds is therefore to impose the additional independence
assumption P(r 6= Kj± = 1;g;p;y) = P(r 6= Kj± = 1;y). The resulting bounds in Figure 4 are
much tighter. For less skilled individuals, however, we do not ¯nd much of an e®ect irrespective of
the marital status and thus only display the result patterns for all less-skilled males together. In
contrast, Figure 4 suggests larger changes in observed exit probabilities for high-skilled job seekers
for whom the threat of entitlement loss after exhausting UNB is likely to be larger. Moreover, we
¯nd heterogeneous result patterns for high-skilled men depending on the marital status. While the
bounds for single males - although only scratching the signi¯cance level - weakly suggest a higher
probability of migration as a main reaction to a cut in PUNBD, we ¯nd a strong and signi¯cant
positive e®ect of the cut in PUNBD on the probability of ¯nding local employment among married
men.
If we assumed independent risks, these ¯ndings would have a causal interpretation in the sense
that extensive unemployment bene¯ts among singles mainly allow for avoiding or postponing
migration such that the reduction of UNB entitlements primarily fosters the willingness to migrate.
From a theoretical perspective, this ¯nding is quite plausible in light of the institutional design in
Germany because the counteracting resource e®ect suggested by Tatsiramos (2008) is likely to be
small. This is because unemployed individuals irrespective of whether receiving UNB or UNA get
¯nancial support for search costs and moving costs. The positive e®ect of lower reservation wages
in case of a cut in PUNBD should thus likely exceed the negative resource e®ect. However, in the
case of married men, high migration cost seem to dominate the response to a cut in PUNBD. For
married men, extensive unemployment bene¯ts rather seem to allow for extending unemployment
before re-entering local employment. As a consequence, a cut in UNB entitlements is unlikely to
foster migration among married unemployed.
We thus ¯nd some interesting evidence that the strength and the type of reaction to reforms of
the unemployment compensation system critically hinge on the household context. This may also
explain why Tatsiramos (2008) could not establish any average e®ect of unemployment bene¯ts
on migration in Germany. However, our ¯ndings are only suggestive for some reform e®ects on
leaving unemployment locally or non-locally as the e®ects on the marginal distributions for the
risk of ¯nding employment locally or non-locally is not identi¯ed in our econometric model without
imposing additional assumption on the dependence structure between risks. In a follow up paper,
Lo and Wilke (2008) check the robustness of our result pattern with respect to the assumed
dependence structure using the 2% sample of our data. They ¯nd that the sign of the estimated
21treatment e®ect is indeed quite robust. For this reason we believe that the sign of changes in the
CIC is also a natural candidate for the sign of the true treatment e®ect.
4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a nonparametric approach that allows for analyzing a competing risk
model with partially identi¯ed interval data. Our bounds analysis is a highly relevant approach for
applied researchers who face this data limitation. It extends the nonparametric bounds analysis
by Lee and Wilke (2008) to a dependent competing risk setting and derives bounds for the risk-
speci¯c cumulative incidence curve. Although our approach does not resolve the non-identi¯ability
of competing risks and thus precludes a direct causal inference, it provides a °exible descriptive
tool for the observed risk-speci¯c transition distribution. In particular, our approach is fully
nonparametric and we avoid strong assumptions on our duration model that may be violated in
the real world. Moreover, we suggest several approaches to tighten the bounds in an application.
In our empirical application with German data, we have explored the e®ect of reducing the
receipt of unemployment bene¯ts on the observed transitions to either local or non-local em-
ployment via migration. Our results show that partial identi¯cation is a big problem in merged
administrative individual data that may preclude any causal inference. Moreover, point estimates
for the lower and upper bound of the latent variable do not span the full width of our estimated
bounds. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis based on the two point estimates alone may be mis-
leading. We obtain considerably tighter bounds by imposing additional assumptions. Similar to
Lee and Wilke (2008) the resulting estimates are suggestive for a reform e®ect on observed exit
probabilities for high-skilled individuals for whom the threat of entitlement loss after exhausting
UNB is likely to be largest. Our results indicate that the e®ect of extensive unemployment bene¯ts
strongly depends on the family background. The cumulative incidence for migration increases for
singles while it remains unchanged for married men. In contrast, we do not observe changes in
the cumulative incidence for local jobs for singles while it increases signi¯cantly for married men.
Unfortunately, administrative data does contain many household background variables. For this
reason, we are not able to capture the decision process about the location of a future job in more
detail.
Other limitations of our approach point towards some interesting extensions. With regard to
data limitations, data with more information on individual and household characteristics would
be desirable to reexamine our empirical results. Such additional information would also allow to
distinguish groups for whom a shorter receipt of unemployment bene¯ts implies di®erent entitle-
ment losses. In addition, the causal inference from our empirical results is limited because of the
22unresolved identi¯cation problem of the competing risks. A promising route for future research
thus is to combine our bounds framework for partially missing data with attempts to derive tighter
identi¯cation bounds such as Honor¶ e and Lleras-Muney (2006) or to assume a dependence struc-
ture as in Lo and Wilke (2008). However, as a disadvantage to our current bounds framework
for cumulative incidence curves, such attempts necessitate additional assumptions. Moreover, a
tightening of bounds could be achieved by estimating P(r 6= Kj± = 1) with additional informa-
tion. This could be done for example if a sample of the administrative data would be merged with
survey data that fully identi¯es the employment trajectories.
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26Appendix A - Computation of actual and counterfactual UNB entitle-
ments
The entitlement length at the beginning of the unemployment spell is not included in the data
and has to be computed based on the known employment history, age and the known regulations
and changes across time. For this purpose, we compute the claim period which encompasses a
maximum of three years prior to making the UNB claim, but ends with a previous UNB claim
within this three years period. In the same token, we calculate the employment duration within
the relevant extended claim period of up to seven years prior to making the claim. As previously
mentioned, UNB entitlements depend on the duration of socially insured employment within
the relevant claim and the relevant extended claim period. Unemployment bene¯ts exceeding 6
month necessitate at least 12 month socially ensured employment within the claim period. Thus,
an individual with at least 12 month socially ensured employment within the claim period and
24 month within the extended claim period gets 12 month of UNB. If there is a shortened claim
period due to a previous UNB claim, the new UNB claim based on the employment periods after
this last unemployment period may be extended up to the age-speci¯c PUNBD by remaining
entitlements at the end of the previous unemployment period if the beginning of the last UNB
claim lies within the last seven years.
For the estimation of actual UNB entitlements all changing regulations throughout the 1980s
and 1990s have been applied. For the counterfactual UNB entitlements, we apply the pre-reform
conditions to the post-reform period and compute the UNB entitlements as if all individuals had
been 42 by the time of the bene¯t claim. More precisely, we adjust the whole age history of an
individual as if, for example, an individual aged 38 at the beginning of the unemployment period
had always been four years older. This adjustment alone does not ensure the comparability of
the resulting counterfactual entitlements for the pre- and post-reform period because entitlements
depend on the entire work history which is subject to all previous changes in regulations. We
therefore compute the counterfactual entitlements for the post-reform period had all changes in
regulations been shifted by ¯ve years, the di®erence between the pre- and post-reform period. This
procedure ensures a twofold: (i) the comparability of counterfactual UNB entitlements for all age
groups irrespective of whether the unemployment period starts prior or after the reform and (ii)
the equivalence of counterfactual and actual UNB entitlements for the treatment group in the pre-
reform era. As a consequence, the treatment group in the pre-reform period with counterfactual
UNB entitlements of more than 12 month actually has entitlements of more than 12 month while
all others who ful¯l this criterium actually receive UNB for a maximum of 12 month only, but are
comparable to the former group in terms of their employment history.
27Appendix B
Table 5: Descriptive summary of sample characteristics, IAB data
Control group Treatment group
Age (years) 38.3 38.3 43.0 43.0
Married 64.7 60.0 71.0 67.4
High school degree 19.9 17.7 18.5 18.2
Vocational training 72.9 75.1 74.8 75.1
Tertiary education 7.2 7.2 6.8 6.7
High-skilled single 2.7 3.2 1.9 2.3
Less-skilled single 32.6 36.9 27.2 30.3
High-skilled married 5.3 4.8 6.0 5.0
Less-skilled married 59.4 55.1 65.0 62.3
Skilled blue-collar 42.1 41.5 42.9 41.0
Unskilled blue-collar 32.3 31.8 30.3 32.0
White-collar 25.6 26.7 26.8 27.0
1st wage quintile 33.9 34.6 34.0 35.4
2nd wage quintile 23.0 24.1 21.8 22.9
3rd wage quintile 15.7 16.1 15.2 15.4
4th wage quintile 14.1 13.2 14.1 12.8
5th wage quintile 13.4 12.0 14.9 13.5
Tenure prev. job (days) 1253 1287 1489 1481
Previously unemployed 63.1 71.5 58.2 69.6
Number of prev. un-
empl. spells
2.8 3.0 2.5 3.0
Total spells 104,069 94,309 39,434 36,104
28Table 6: Median unemployment duration by sub-sample and de¯nition
of unempoyment










high-skilled singles 274 178 364 214
less-skilled singles 243 183 303 214
high-skilled married men 184 123 233 165
less-skilled married men 159 134 183 154
UB spells
high-skilled singles 488 278 648 369
less-skilled singles 336 243 449 291
high-skilled married men 367 246 434 305
less-skilled married men 211 177 245 200
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29Figure 3: Lower and upper bound of the DiD changes of the cumulative incidence of local (left)
and non-local (right) exits to employment among selected groups.
high skilled, single males

































































































































































30Figure 4: Lower and upper bound of the DiD changes of the cumulative incidence of local (left)
and non-local (right) exits to employment among selected groups, additional assumption.
high skilled, single males



































































































































31Figure 5: Point estimates for lower and upper bound of treatment e®ect on the cumulative in-
cidence of local(left) and non-local(right) exits to employment among high-skilled unemployed,
married males.
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